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Abstract 
From the establishment and implementation of the United States’ rebalancing 
strategy to China’s modern-era economic and militaristic rise, there is undoubtedly 
a heightened sense of focus, substance, and weight directed on the peripheral 
entities that serve as quasi-gatekeepers of security for nation-states. Moreover, 
with the U.S. Asia-Pacific rebalance remaining relatively difficult to implement, as 
well as delicate Okinawa-Tokyo relations, it is critical to examine socio-political 
insights into the center-periphery relations focused on the periphery. As such, the 
main aim of this paper is to develop an analytical framework, based on the nature 
of center-periphery relations, to assess the extent of power peripheral entities have 
in negotiations with their centers in terms of autonomy and security. The 
framework is then applied to the case of inter-governmental negotiations between 
the U.S. and Guam with regards to the unincorporated territory's political status 
and U.S. military bases. Using Guam as the case study, the research design uses 
qualitative interview methods in Guam with the island-leadership, the in-betweens, 
and grassroots to draw out first-hand insights on the rebalance, political status, and 
identity, as related to the questions of roles and powers in the periphery. In the end, 
to the questions of role(s) and powers of the periphery the answer remains highly 
dependent on various factors, most notably, a) the nature of the periphery’s 
relationship to the center, b) the subject matters at hand (the strategy, policy, or 
matter in correspondence), and c) the intents of the periphery/center. Despite-so, 
the paper does illustrate that the developing analytical framework indicates a need 
for the theoretical component behind center-periphery relations to be expanded for 
a fuller-picture. Likewise, the socio-political insights offered via original interviews 
indicate a necessity in policy adjustments by the United States (center) to her 
periphery (Guam) in order to achieve mutual-intents with the highest agreeable-
terms on referenced issues such as the Asia-Pacific rebalance and political status. 
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1. Introduction 
"Guam is a pawn. [Now] is the pawn going to be in rebellion, how important is the pawn in 
relations to other pawns, those are the further questions."  
              - Robert A. Underwood  
 ? ?      (former Congressman & current University of Guam President) 
 
From the establishment and implementation of the United States’ rebalancing strategy1 to 
China’s modern-era economic and militaristic rise2, there is undoubtedly a heightened sense 
of focus, substance, and weight directed on the peripheral entities that serve as quasi-
gatekeepers of security for nation-states.  
As such, the main aim of this paper is to develop an analytical framework, based on the 
nature of peripheral relations, for assessing the extent of power peripheral entities have in 
negotiations with their centers in terms of autonomy and security3. The framework is then 
applied to the case of inter-governmental negotiations between the U.S. and Guam with 
regards to the unincorporated territory's political status and U.S. military bases. In addition, 
the scope is mostly confined to the period after October 20114 and to the internal peripheral 
dynamics, i.e. Guam and Okinawa, of selected democratic nations, i.e. the United States and 
Japan, in the Asia-Pacific. 
Similar to the decision-making process in game theory5, the correct interpretation of 
subject and intent in both the periphery and center will play a strong role in determining the 
cooperation, sustainability, and development of the relationship. It is reasonable to argue 
that the role(s) and powers can be interchangeable at times, with neither one nor the other 
being able to dictate the terms for each other. Likewise, as intents and subject matters shift 
and change, neither role nor power is definite and everlasting in each situation.  
Whether the periphery possesses power in negotiations or not, is relegated a lesser 
position or not, or if it is a part of the dialogue or apart from the dialogue, the paper asserts 
that only by understanding the nature of peripheral relations, that stem from and is well-
rooted in certain facets such as history, culture, governance, natural resources, and security, 
can more concrete actions such as lawsuits to protect ancestral-lands, educational campaigns 
towards an island-wide plebiscite, or people-power for decolonization follow.  
 
                                                     
1 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament," 
November 17, 2011. 
2 Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, "China's Military Budget Increasing 10% for 2015, Official Says," New York 
Times, March 4, 2015. 
3 For more on author's usage of security and power, see works by E.H. Carr ("Realism and Idealism", in Betts, 
Conflict After the Cold War, 2008), Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 1948), 
Walt (Theory of International Politics, 1979), and Mearsheimer (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001).  
4 Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011. 
5 Stephen L. Quackenbush and Frank C. Zagare, "Game Theory: Modeling Interstate Conflict," in Making Sense of 
IR Theory, (2006), 98-114; Quackenbush and Zagare, 14. 
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2. The ‘Peripheral’ Relationship - Overview 
Defining the central concepts of the periphery, the center, and the ‘peripheral relationship’ 
itself is essential to more substantive readings into this paper; a paper that will use Guam 
as a case study in the attempt to reinterpret the peripheral relationship. 
First, periphery in the context of this paper is used to describe the internal entities (i.e. 
territories, prefecture) on the outer edges (hence ‘periphery’) of nation-states. For the case 
study in question, the peripheral entities that are deemed as significantly strategic would 
therefore be Guam for the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Second, the center although 
commonly referred to as the capital or core, i.e. Washington or Tokyo, represents the ruling 
government at-large. And third, the peripheral relationship is the relations, be it cultural, 
historical, or further, between the center and the periphery.  
Many possibilities in the peripheral relationship do exist. The type of security role(s) the 
periphery, as designated by the center, takes on could simply be that of a pawn to the 
nation-state, a largely inconsequential entity that can only move forward without the ability 
to take a step-back. Or, it could be closer to that of a queen where the powers are so 
concentrated that nearly all directions and all options may be open to movement. More 
realistically, however, the answer is likely to be a bit of both—a bishop or castle. One that 
can negotiate or have freedom of movement to a certain extent, but is still bounded to a 
‘secondary’ position per se. Regardless of role, this designation by the center remains a 
powerful indicator of center-periphery relations.  
Though slightly different from the Guam case study, as the island despite being a U.S. 
territory remains on the U.N.’s decolonization list, parts of Michael Hechter’s work on 
internal colonialism, written before the Welsh and Scottish parliamentary devolutions 
(1997), paint a strikingly accurate picture that can be applied to the U.S. - Guam peripheral 
relationship. Hechter states that, “the obstacle to…development suggested by the internal 
colonial model analogy…relates not to a failure of peripheral integration with the core but to 
a malintegration [sic] established on terms increasingly regarded as unjust and 
illegitimate.”6 Moreover, “the dominated society is condemned to an instrumental role by the 
metropolis.”7 On Guam, for instance, this would refer to the island's designated security role 
and the disproportionately heavy military infrastructure and installments on island as 
opposed to adjusting for developmental integration on par with the center (the US 
mainland/Washington). With reference to power in autonomy and security, the rebalance 
and political status issue is a frequent reminder for Guam of her questionable status and 
role as a United States colony. 
                                                     
6 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1975), 34. 
7 ibid., 30. 
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In the end, while research derived from paper analyses and policy details will further 
refine the originality and literary contribution by offering a separate distinctive outlook into 
center-periphery relations8, the questions of role(s) and powers of a periphery the answer 
remains highly dependent on various factors, most notably, a) the nature of the periphery’s 
relationship to the center, b) the subject matters at hand (the strategy, policy, or matter in 
correspondence), and c) the intents of the periphery/center.  
 
3. Research Design, Framework, & Methodology 
Naturally, if the degree of power or type of role relegated to the peripheral entity is largely 
dependent on the peripheral relationship, the paper then asserts that the nature of the 
peripheral relationship, subject/intent, and the resulting roles/powers to be the independent, 
intervening, and dependent variables, respectively. 
In terms of the aforementioned analytical framework, the specific aims are to a) develop a 
more complete understanding of center-periphery relations using the five facets in the 
nature of peripheral relations, b) to situate each facet as a primary (short-term) or secondary 
(mid-long term) concern of importance for policymakers to evaluate, and c) to assess the 
peripheral relationship given the facets and concerns. The framework is currently limited in 
the following ways: a) providing more breadth as opposed to depth, b) suggestive (filling in 
the picture) rather than exhaustive (painting the picture).  
With that said, the framework is then applied in the following order: evaluating the 
nature of the peripheral relationship (stage 1), determining the importance of each facet 
based on immediate existential concerns (stage 2), and finally concluding the implications on 
the peripheral relationship as applied via the framework to individual cases (stage 3). 
Using Guam as the case study, the research design uses qualitative interview methods in 
Guam with the island-leadership9, the in-betweens, and grassroots to draw out first-hand 
insights on the rebalance, political status, and identity, as related to the questions of roles 
and powers in the periphery.  
Interviews were conducted from the periphery in a semi-structured fashion with each 
interview lasting from thirty-minutes to a little above an hour depending on individual 
schedules. Roughly half of the interviews were conducted during August-2014 while the 
other half done in July-2015.  
 
                                                     
8 For more on author's intent in center-periphery relations, see works by Immanuel Wallerstein (The Essential 
Wallerstein, 2000) on world-systems, Carlos Escude (Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina, 1997) on 
peripheral sovereignties, and Gearóid O' Tuathail (A Geopolitics Reader, 2006) on geopolitical influence. 
9 Amongst the leadership, the Guam-legislature is only comprised of fifteen senators. 
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4. The Nature of the Peripheral Relationship - Expanded Framework 
To better understand the natural relationship between the periphery and the center, it is 
necessary that five distinct yet encompassing facets be briefly examined and evaluated for 
the Guam-case study; facets that include the areas of history, culture, governance, natural 
resources, and last but not least security (physical and conceptual).   
Beginning with history, this facet looks at the past for answers to the present and future. 
Particularly in cases such as Okinawa, for instance, a controversial or shared history can 
make or break the peripheral relationship. Due to the unforgiving atrocities that occurred 
throughout Okinawa’s historical memory10, citizens of Okinawa are much less likely to 
embrace militarization in the prefecture. In short, history as a facet is extremely 
straightforward – whether or not the periphery and her people hold historical animosities 
towards the center would result in policy impasse and vice-versa (alternatively, affirmative 
shared history would bring positive influences that likely ease the administration’s 
development in negotiations and policy). 
Consciously separate from history, culture, as a facet, is perhaps a bit more complex to 
evaluate in terms of the periphery and center. Certainly, history can be an obstacle to the 
relationship. However, if the modern-day culture has been assimilated to a point where 
reconciliation at-large has taken place and no longer affects short and long term affairs, then 
culture can be regarded as a redeeming factor to the peripheral relationship.  
Here, Guam is an exemplary case study. Despite the island-territory being a largely 
Spanish overseas colony for hundreds of years11, as well as suffering through immense 
tragedy in World War II 12 , the incorporation of a Guam Guard (U.S. military) 13  and 
subsequent American-culturalization has ebbed the flow of animosity and created a largely 
patriotic and harmonious local-society in tune with the center.14 That in it of itself has 
allowed for a much smoother transition in the push for security initiatives. Culture, in areas 
where history remains difficult, is an answer and alternative that allows future and present 
generations a sense of belonging despite troubled pasts. 
One of the most critical factors to a peripheral relationship, governance or the type of 
government that the peripheral entity holds is key to what type of relationship and with 
what powers she can function on. Essentially, it can be seen as the hand that you’re dealt 
with (in terms of cards). From an autonomous country in a Kingdom (i.e. Greenland) to an 
unincorporated territory (i.e. Guam), the various types of governance spells out the different 
                                                     
10 Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945 (New York: Random House, 1978), 185. 
11 Patricia L.G. Taimanglo, "The Chamorro People of Guam," American Psychological Association (Communiqué), 
August 2010. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Capt. Ken Ola, "Guam Guard's First Adjutant General Dies," National Guard, January 23, 2012. 
14 Hannah M.T. Gutierrez, “Guam’s Future Political Status,” Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal Vol. 4, issue no. 1 
(Winter 2003): 138, 147. 
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types of leverage that a periphery has when in talks with the center regarding the 
management of her security situation.  
Likewise, from the amount of dependency a periphery has to the center to the political 
associations attached, a peripheral relationship is largely based on the type of governance 
that it currently has. Equally important, however, is the possibility of movement within the 
types of governance.  
For instance, whilst entities such as the territory of Guam may remain in political status 
quo due to current deadlocks between statehood, free association, or independence, others 
such as Greenland are making progress towards a self-sustainable economic and security-
defense situation that may eventually lead to full-independence. As such, the future prospect 
of governance within the periphery impacts the well-being of the peripheral relationship as 
well. By and large, the influence of governing powers associated with or entrusted to the 
periphery can heavily sway the direction, weight, and even worth of a peripheral 
relationship. 
Natural resources in the periphery, including minerals, gas, oil, and so forth, is another 
critical factor that influences the amount of leverage a peripheral entity has in negotiations 
between the center and periphery. Ultimately, the evaluation of this facet can be seen as a 
judgment on whether the peripheral entity is either self-sustaining15 in present or could 
become self-sustainable in the future. If either possibility exists, then the peripheral 
relationship could be greatly influenced or broken (from the center). If not, then dependency 
on the center for survival becomes an inherent addiction forcing the periphery to adapt to 
the needs of the center rather than the other way around.  
Beyond sustainability, natural resources may also be seen as a point of value. Whether or 
not the center's upkeep or maintenance of its periphery is on par with the natural (or 
established) value associated with the periphery should also be considered. Of course, 
distance, population, and other 'natural' aspects are areas within the facet that should also 
be highlighted if important. Thus, leading to our final and perhaps most significant facet.  
Security, again arguably the most vital of all five facets, is similarly the most complex. 
Under the pretense of security, sometimes, the center is allowed incredible freedoms and 
powers in achieving its aims through rather creative or intelligent manners16—which is why 
security to be understood can be rather complex.  
Here, security, from the center's perspective (although frequently in cohesion with the 
periphery), will be split into two distinguishable segments. Security that focuses on the 
psychological concerns in strategy and power, and security that is embodied in the physical 
                                                     
15 Here, self-sustaining refers to the ability of a peripheral entity in running a stand-alone economy based on 
available natural resources, aforementioned, rather than monetary subsidies from the center.   
16 National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758; Catherine Lutz, 
"US Military Bases on Guam in Global Perspective," The Asia-Pacific Journal 30 (2010): 3-10. 
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realizations of the military, such as bases or artillery, which serve from the periphery in 
question. Greenland, for instance, may be important geopolitically to the Arctic Circle, 
particularly to Denmark; however, the amount of foreign and domestic military stationed on 
the landmass itself is not equivalent to what it should be based on geographical size and 
strategic value (for instance, to Denmark or the U.S.)—as in a strong conceptualized security 
that may pale in comparison in actuality. 
However unlikely, certain hypothetical events such as Russia or China acting assertively 
or aggressively in their respective regions, would, for instance, impel the United States or 
Japan to significantly alter the peripheral relationship so that the first points of contact can 
meet state (center) security needs. Quite frequently, the raison d'être of a periphery in a 
strategically significant location is to provide for the theoretical and actual security of the 
center and state at-large. As a result, in the decision-making process vis-à-vis the periphery, 
security concerns are sometimes the end-all be-all. 
Although situational and varying case-by-case, the five-distinct facets presented above 
illustrate the basics to the complexity behind the natural understandings of a peripheral 
relationship—an understanding that will subsequently shape the natural strategic 
blueprints to follow. Likewise, the intents/subject as perceived by either side in the 
peripheral relationship will likely affect the amount of power or type of role relegated to the 
periphery based on mutual or differing stances; the former offering more power and 
cooperation with the latter reversed.  
 
5. Asia-Pacific Main Case Study: Guam (Guahan)17 
At the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Guam was ceded to the United States as 
part of the Treaty of Paris.18 In the modern-era, the island is an unincorporated territory of 
the latter by way of the Guam Organic Act of 195019, with a brief yet brutal stint from 1941-
1944 by the Japanese in WWII before being recaptured by the United States.20 Roughly 
three times the size of Washington D.C. with a population of nearly 170,00021, of which the 
primary-ethnic group belongs to the indigenous Chamorros2223, and two strategically critical 
military bases (Anderson Air Force Base and Apra Naval Base)24 Guam acts as a significant 
hub for security affairs to the United States in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
                                                     
17 Guahan is the proper-title for Guam in the Chamorro-language. 
18 Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain, U.S. Congress, 55th Cong. 3d sess., Senate Doc. No. 62, 
Part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 5-11. 
19 Organic Act of Guam, 64 Stat. 384, codified as 48 U.S.C. 1421, et seq (1950). 
20 Taimanglo, Communiqué, 1.  
21 Shirley A Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress 
(2014): 1. 
22 Taimanglo, Communiqué, 1. 
23 Chamorros are the indigenous-people of Guam.  
24 Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” 1. 
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5.1 The Nature of the Peripheral Relationship: Guam 
The nature of the peripheral relationship between Guam and the United States, as 
observed vis-à-vis the aforesaid facets, is as follows: 
 
Historically, the island-territory has been a Spanish colony for over three hundred years 
since Ferdinand Magellan’s first discovery in 1521. After relinquishing the islands to the 
United States following the loss of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Guam became a U.S. 
possession until the Guam Organic Act (GOA) of 1950 established the island as an 
unincorporated territory simultaneously granting U.S. citizenship to her people henceforth. 
Critically, however, as the civilian-structured rule of law was established through the GOA 
(U.S. Congress) instead of the U.S. Constitution, the island’s U.S. citizens are unable to vote 
for the U.S. President and also do not have voting representation in Congress.25  
As a facet, a little over a century’s worth of historical influence and continued governance 
under the United States has vastly increased as well as consolidated the affinity between the 
island and the mainland; overcoming issues such as distance. Moreover, the facet is more 
stabilizing to the peripheral relationship rather than destabilizing; although, the occasional 
question of war reparations26 still affects the relationship detrimentally. Overall, the nature 
of the peripheral relationship is held intact rather than hurt by historical understandings. 
Thus, the facet can be considered as a secondary-concern to the relationship.   
Additionally, in terms of culture the island and her people do retain deeply rooted Spanish 
traditions as a result of centuries of Spanish colonialism. Be it by lineage, as many do have 
Spanish blood, or by tradition, in the form of fiestas, language, or even faith, overwhelmingly 
Catholic27, the Chamorros and Guamanians are immensely yet passively influenced by their 
once Spanish colonizers. Currently, however, the psychological political identification with 
the United States through education, citizenship, and the passing of time reflect a stronger 
conscious cultural connection with the United States as an affiliated American, Guamanian, 
or Chamorro.  
With the historical facet being less contentious than say in Okinawa, for instance, 
sustaining a stable, intact, and well-maintained foundation between the island and the 
United States, cultural integration, in conjunction with considerations for preserving 
indigenous Chamorro culture, is a beneficial facet to inter-state negotiations while creating a 
mutual sense of identity, belonging, and purpose. A dual political identity between the 
island and the United States would not jeopardize a hypothetical situation just as having 
pride in being from the East Coast or the Deep South would not hurt negotiations as fellow 
                                                     
25 Michael Lujan Bevacqua, "The (Un)exceptional Life of a Non-Voting Delegate: Guam and the Production of 
American Sovereignty," Pacific Asia Inquiry Vol. 3, issue no. 1 (2012). 
26 Staff Reports, "The Fight for War Reparations," Stars and Stripes (Micronesia Area Research Center, 2010), 1. 
27 Congressional Record, V. 148, PT. 1, January 23, 2002 to February 13, 2002. 
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Americans. Perspectives may change, but core values do not. Again, a more secondary-facet 
than primary. 
Governance, somewhat mentioned in the historical facet, is perhaps the most critical facet 
in the island’s case study. Current Governor of Guam Eddie B. Calvo during his inaugural 
address has already indicated that “any status is better than unincorporated territory”28 of 
the United States. In other words, the current status appropriated by the U.S. Congress to 
Guam is one that is minimal to say the least, behind the full powers of a state and even that 
of a commonwealth such as Puerto Rico. With neither the ability to vote for President nor 
the capacity to have full representation in Congress, the island is immediately relegated to 
‘second-class’ status by default. U.S. citizenship, although internationally recognized, is no 
substitute to real political currency and sway that, for instance, swing states in the United 
States often have.  
The lack of power that the island leadership has because of the appropriated governing 
structure translates to inefficient if not incapacitated talks between Hagatna 29  and 
Washington. Similarly, regardless of the cultural value, environmental urgency, or issues of 
human rights/decolonization surrounding certain negotiations such as the rebalance or 
political status, the heavily weakened or nonexistent power is not only clearly visible but 
would require drastic measures over time to correct. 
As a facet, it is ironically one of the strongest weakening factors to the peripheral 
relationship from Hagatna’s point of view. A primary-concern that would be increasingly 
difficult to resolve without a finished plebiscite, strong-leadership, and political will of the 
islanders in subjects such as the island’s political status or rebalance build-up.  
Economically speaking, beyond tourism and military installments, Guam holds very little 
in terms of natural resources such as minerals, oil, or gas. However, a lack of resources is 
not indicative of future roles or powers in terms of the peripheral relationship. Certainly, 
there would be sway had vast amounts of natural resources been well-hidden, discovered, 
and utilized for major industries, yet other nation-states or former colonies, despite not 
being in a peripheral relationship per se but existed very much in the periphery, such as 
Hong Kong30 or Singapore31 were able to adapt, in spite of their circumstances, to create 
major political, economic, and industrial hubs regardless of their lack of resources. 
To be pragmatic, however, is to acknowledge that there are no readily available natural 
resources in the near to far future. Instead, focusing on developing current major industries, 
regardless of political positions, would be more practical as a tool in future inter-state 
                                                     
28 Gov. Eddie B. Calvo, "State of the Island Address," Office of the Governor of Guam, February 16, 2015. 
29 Formal-title for the island's capital. 
30  John Page, and E. Campos, "The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy," World Bank, 
Washington DC (1993). 
31 Ibid. 
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negotiations of role and powers vis-à-vis Washington. Immediately, though, the facet is a 
secondary-concern. 
Officially-speaking, Guam is a significantly strategic territory in the Asia-Pacific that 
allows the United States access to the nearby routes and waters, serves as a refueling 
station, hosts various military exercises, and a variety of other purposes that forwards the 
U.S. agenda. From thought to practice, the idea is very much true in reality as well. With 
two major military installments, Anderson Air Force Base and Apra Naval Base, nuclear-
attack submarines, anti-missile defense, amongst others, the evidence points to a security 
and strategy effort that is not only being realized but is continually advancing with joint-
government efforts, for instance, by the United States and Japan in terms of marine-
deployments and costs associated with the rebalance strategy. Most recently, in “April 2014, 
President Obama issued a U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, reaffirming that ‘the United States 
and Japan are...making sustained progress towards...the development of Guam as a 
strategic hub.’"32  
Without a doubt, the other principal primary-concern amongst the facets, security, both 
conceptual and in reality, has ‘secured’ the island’s near future so-to-speak as any shifts in 
the region, independently, and so forth would translate as drastic breaches to U.S. authority, 
public-image, and the internal-workings of the region. In the long-term, however, security 
may have indirectly doomed the island—or, as former Guam-Congressman Robert 
Underwood declares as the island's "birthmark curse"33—relegating her to a minor status 
without full powers for an extended period of time; until a point where a decision in political 
status by the islanders would not hinder nor hurt the original intentions and blueprint of the 
United States.  
So far, in assessing the nature of the island’s peripheral relationship, security and 
governance has been evaluated as primary concerns that affects Hagatna’s role and powers 
in inter-state negotiations with Washington immediately, permanently, and to a great-
extent, whilst history, culture, and natural resources are less significant secondary concerns 
that do influence the overall nature without the intensity as the aforementioned.  
Instead of purely definite answers to which roles and what powers, at the end of the 
investigative process, it becomes apparent as to the key influencers that structure the inter-
state negotiations and narratives.  
In the Guam case study, to discover the proper roles/powers to the island, the subjects of 
security and governance must lead before the other facets can be addressed. Otherwise, it is 
an inefficient alternative that is moving away from the end-goal rather than towards it. 
Therefore, understanding the nature of peripheral relations thus serves to better clarify the 
                                                     
32 Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” Summary. 
33 Robert Underwood, author-interview, Aug-2014.  
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underlying reasons behind which roles and what powers the island serves vis-à-vis the 
United States. 
Alternatively, however, the investigation does allow separate takes on the relationship by 
opening possibilities of say, for instance, using the secondary concerns as motion to pressure 
primary concerns. Though judgment would lie in the interpretation of the facets and the 
strategy being implemented. 
 
5.2 Political Status: Guam (Intent/Subject) 
Shifting from the independent to intervening variable, understanding the nature of the 
peripheral relationship subsequently allows for the analysis or question of intent/subject to 
begin.  
A case within the case, in reference to the political status issue, in 1982 the first self-
determination plebiscite was held on Guam regarding her political status vis-à-vis the 
United States with the following five political options: Statehood, Commonwealth, Status 
Quo, Independence, and Free Association; in the end Commonwealth and Statehood were 
the top-two with Commonwealth prevailing but eventually collapsed at the executive 
branch.34 In 1997, the Guam Decolonization Commission was established and revised the 
original plebiscite to one with three terminal options based on a mandate by the United 
Nations, namely: Statehood, Independence, and Free Association.35  
As a reminder, while the Organic Act serves as a local constitution for Guam, the island 
does not retain the same powers that are reserved to American states, as the US Congress 
"retains plenary power (that is, authority) to amend the act or to enact any legislation it 
wishes for Guam without the consent of Guamanian US citizens"36—including political 
status.  
Due to obstacles such as insufficient funding or low voter-registration as required by law, 
the political status of Guam has remained in question without too much advancement in any 
one direction.  
We need to note that if Washington and Hagatna had a near identical understanding on 
the island’s political status, whether in total concurrence or dissent, then the island would 
have already attained, for instance, the status of commonwealth. However, since there is a 
difference in intent on the subject matter, therefore plebiscites were held and negotiations 
did occur. To what extent did the role or powers of the periphery influence said negotiations 
is what is to be explored and assessed. 
                                                     
34 LisaLinda Natividad, "U.N. Decolonization Statement - Statement by Representative of Guam," United Nations, 
PRS/2012/CRP.9 May 30 - June 1, 2012. 
35 Ibid.  
36 E. Robert Statham Jr., "Reformation of the Guam Legislature," The Journal of Legislative Studies Vol. 3, issue 
no. 4 (1997): 127. 
159
With that said, referring to the nature of the relationship to explain the periphery vis-à-
vis the center, governance and security has already been established previously as key 
natural facets that influence the scenario. Unfortunately for the island-periphery, the 
assessment of both facets translates to a removal of powers and an already designated or 
delegated role for the island.  
To illustrate, just as the Guam Organic Act handed down by the U.S. Congress years 
before altered the island's political status, likewise the decision of the executive branch 
doomed negotiations (Washington's intent) despite the conclusive island-wide vote of a 
desired Commonwealth status (Hagatna's intent). And, as the rationale below insinuates, 
the island’s role as a territory is seen as precisely the logic for why the center’s interests is to 
dissolve the political status issue. Unless Hagatna can reassure Washington that any shift 
in her political status is a beneficial move for Washington, then save a whirlwind 
combination of outstanding leadership, political will, plebiscites, and copious lawsuits, the 
case is perhaps closed for the foreseeable future.  
 
5.2.1 Intent 
Taking a closer-look into the political status issue, as legal-expert Hannah M.T. Gutierrez 
notes, "Guam has its own experience and historical relationship with the United 
States...[and] Indeed, U.S. citizenship—and the fifty-year quest to obtain that statues[sic]—
has been an integral part of Guam's history and experience. [As such, it] can and should be a 
significant part of any future relationship with the United States."37 In reference to the U.S. 
citizenship, as a part of the political status issue, Gutierrez echoes the intents of a vast-
majority of Chamorros and Guamanians living on the island. Regardless of how the situation 
is resolved, U.S. citizenship is seen as an irrefutable component of the historical struggle in 
roles and powers.  
While status has been and still is fought through political and legislative channels—[with 
the] United States thwarting attempts through inaction or amnesia38—a majority of local 
leaders strongly affirm their U.S. affiliation/citizenship while simultaneously seeking 
greater political autonomy, limits to federal power, and primacy for the island's indigenous.39  
On Washington's end, however, Congressional think-tank expert Shirley Kan asserts that 
the rationale for the military build-up (rebalance) on Guam is precisely due to the territory's 
status. As it stands, "the United States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries 
on force deployments or face the risks of losing bases or access"40—vis-à-vis the territorial-
island.  
                                                     
37 Hannah M.T. Gutierrez, “Guam’s Future Political Status,” 148. 
38 Valerie Solar Woodward, “Reading American Empire in Guam,” The Contemporary Pacific Vol. 25, issue no. 1 
(2013): 72. 
39 Frank Quimby, “Fortress Guahan,” The Journal of Pacific History Vol. 46, issue no. 3 (December 2011): 357. 
40 Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” 10. 
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In the end, proper alignments of intent within agreeable-terms would be a win-win of 
moral, ethical, and even realpolitik grounds, particularly in preventing an adverse power-
struggle rising from differing end-points. For instance, the support and agreement of the 
Guam Governor’s Office and Guam Legislature for the military build-up came only with the 
understanding that there would be enhancements to the local infrastructure, protection of 
ancestral-lands, and further negotiations on war reparations to the Chamorro-people.41 
Without clear understanding of details and to what extent, mutual-intents on agreeable-
terms would clearly be difficult to accomplish.  
 
5.2.2 Subject 
As a subject, political status should show mutual benefits to both the island and the 
United States if there is a desire to achieve concrete outcomes. Though, at the current stage 
of complacency on-island, it appears difficult to use human rights or political will to push the 
agenda with regards to the aforementioned grounds of morality and realpolitik. 
As former Congressman "Underwood...[states] ‘the desire for political fulfillment will 
always be a feature of Guam’s ongoing relationship with the US. At times, this desire will 
appear dormant and then it will spring to life as it did in the 1930s and 1940s and again in 
the 1970s and 1980s.’" 42  Moreover, only by understanding the "surge of indigenous 
agitation"43 can primary concerns be resolved. As a subject, however, even former Chamorro-
delegate to the UN decolonization committee Senator Hope Cristobal acknowledges that 
political status is an almost dead-issue at the moment without the necessary plebiscites and 
an increasingly apathetic populace44; ironic as the role and powers are in part defined 
precisely because of a lack in political will for role and powers. 
 
6. The Interviews (With References to the Rebalance)45 
As a collection of original sources, interviews regarding the paper's aforementioned aims 
were conducted with the intent to illuminate further insight into the peripheral relationship. 
Interview excerpts from selected individuals, as well as the data reflected in Tables 1-4, 
serve to highlight the prominence of roles/powers in peripheral discussions. Likewise, the 
excerpts showcase the respective voices of influential figures representing the leadership or 
grassroots on key-matters such as the rebalance or political status for a more diverse and 
encompassing outlook.  
 
                                                     
41 Kan, “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments,” 16-17. 
42 Quimby, “Fortress Guahan,” 377. 
43 Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Crisostomo, “Strategic Guam,” USAWC Strategy Research Project (2013), 24. 
44 Hope Cristobal, recorded-interview by author, University of Guam, July 14, 2015. 
45 Each-interview part of a collection originally sourced by the author; individual profiles available on request; all 
quotes taken from interviews-directly. 
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Table 1 Identity Composition 
Identity Chamorro Guamanian Amer./Guam. Other. 
Interview-Members 81% (9) 0% (0) 9% (1) 9% (1) 
Total 99% (11)46 
Source: Author's Compilation 
 
Table 2 Member Associations 
Association Leadership In-Betweens Grassroots 
Interview-Members 63% (7) 18% (2) 18% (2) 
Total 99% (11) 
Source: Author's Compilation 
 
Table 3 Views of the Political Status Issue 
Political Status Issue Free Association Independence Statehood N/A 
Interview-Members 63% (7) 9% (1) 9% (1) 18% (2) 
Total 99% (11) 
Source: Author's Calculation 
 
Table 4 Views on Guam's Role in the Peripheral Relationship (w/ Washington) 
Chess-Concept  
(Role of Periphery) Pawn Castle/Bishop
Potential 
Queen47 
Interview-Members 72% (8) 27% (3) [27% - 3] 
Total 99% (11) & [27% - 3] 
Source: Author's Calculation 
 
On the outlook of Guam's role and powers vis-à-vis the rebalance, Speaker Won Pat of the 
leadership states that, "Because we are a colony, because we are so small, there is really 
very little impact that we could have in terms of the relationship with the United States, 
being a powerful country." In addition, the U.S. uses the "Jones Act (merchant marine act of 
1920), restrictions, to keep us where they can control us, to become dependent to the United 
States and dollar." Furthermore, while "Japan is at the table, [the] US is at the table, we're 
not at the table at all, Okinawa is not at the table, they're overburdened too" in reference to 
negotiations and security affairs vis-à-vis the military buildup. While the Speaker cites the 
                                                     
46 Number in parenthesis represents total number of individuals interviewed, w/ selections (votes) tallied into 
percentages.  
47 No interviewee, outright, selected queen as a US designate-role for Guam. However, referencing the increase in 
military buildup and rebalance strategy, a few did refer to the expanded potential-role of the island to the United 
States as that of a possible shift for Guam from a pawn/castle/bishop to that of a queen. 
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Jones Act as well as 'not sitting at the table' in arguing Guam's particular reality in 
roles/powers vis-à-vis the United States. Her words are strikingly strong in resonating a 
sense of powerlessness at dealing with the central government-at-large from the periphery's 
perspective.  
Offering institutional insight, a frequent guest to Guam and an in-between in this paper, 
former Minister of State for External Affairs (U.S. Virgin Islands) Dr. Corbin explains that, 
for instance, "[We're] not members of the United Nations. At a disadvantage, we could not 
negotiate. Just provided information. But, [we] did belong to other bodies (international)." As 
such, you could get "something tabled and adopted to move policy forward (at a higher level)" 
to "influence the process." Therefore, according to Dr. Corbin, as petitioners at the U.N. 
during the decolonization (political status) hearings, Guam may have been simply subjects 
being discussed, however, membership or participation in other forms and forums did allow 
the island to create its own role/power to influence subsequent actions; a different outlook 
globally versus the earlier domestic one.  
Guam-academic and president of the Guahan Coalition for Peace & Justice, Dr. Natividad 
believes that while, "[Guam] do[esn't] sit at the table [being] absolutely a pawn. A piece of 
[inexpensive] real estate. [With the] lack of political power [in part] because of the political 
status issues", the "US absolutely hates to be shamed" internationally. Thus, despite a "One-
sided and abusive relationship driven by what America needs and wants", Dr. Natividad 
asserts that Guam's roles/powers can be expanded and achieved through generating greater 
political will via global activism and awareness of the issues such as colonization or military 
buildup. 
On a calmer-note, slightly differing from earlier critics, President Underwood states that 
"Guam's role and America's ability to project power into this environment, is not as a 
policeman but rather a stabilizing force" and that "the issues of Guam are not of intellectual 
stance but rather political will." As a former congressman as well, President Underwood 
presents a more diplomatic tone in discussing the aforesaid issues, asserting that in the 
right-time and right-place, negotiating roles/powers is not impossible nor improbable, but 
patience and readiness are key rather than "political theatre." 
Our last influential excerpt, lawsuit lead attorney Leevin Camacho emphasizes that while 
"Change in numbers, or force posture, permanent to rotations, was between the politics of 
the governments and funding, something like live fire range areas or site, [he is] extremely 
confident was affected by lawsuit." Camacho asserts that the "power of the people and the 
power of the law was what prevailed."  
Separately, on ways the periphery may influence the process, Camacho considers "political 
capital that you create with lawsuits is what you need" as a power of the periphery. 
Claiming the most-recent victorious lawsuit against the Department of Defense as 
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"symbolically, a water-shed moment" providing a practical/legal perspective outside of 
institutional/global awareness initiatives.  
All in all, the interviews signify and illustrate in detail, from institutional insight to 
political and legal perspectives, the voice and outlook from the periphery adding to center-
periphery discourse. 
 
7. Closing/Conclusion 
In the end, it is absolutely clear that in the pursuit of which roles and what powers 
peripheral entities possess, key-influencers to narratives are discovered via evaluations on 
the nature of the peripheral relationship.  
Essentially, the independent variable that is the nature of peripheral relations remains 
the single-largest factor in determining the peripheral relationship, followed by the 
intervening variables of subject and intent (possible game-changing indicators), that 
ultimately determine the outcome of the extent of power and type of role(s) (dependent 
variables) relegated to the periphery.   
In addition, concise-versions of extended interviews with Guam's leadership, the in-
betweens, and grassroots has indicated that there is an overwhelming Chamorro-majority 
that consider the periphery to need a role but not necessarily have the power for a 
meaningful-one (being relegated to a pawn's position). The socio-political insights offered via 
original interviews indicate a necessity in policy adjustments by the United States (center) 
to her periphery (Guam) in order to achieve mutual-intents with the highest agreeable-terms 
on referenced issues such as the Asia-Pacific rebalance and political status. Moreover, the 
paper also illustrates that the developing analytical framework indicates a need for the 
theoretical component behind center-periphery relations to be expanded in breadth for a 
fuller-picture.  
Regardless of the particular issue, as quasi-gatekeepers of security for nation-states, only 
through proper insights, perspectives, and understanding about the nature of the peripheral 
relationship, subject/intent, and related-issues (i.e. rebalance/political status), can the 
periphery seek to evolve and transition itself in negotiations and security affairs. 
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